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Abtract: 
Secret-sharing schemes describe methods to securely share a secret among a group of participants. A properly constructed 
secret-sharing scheme guarantees that the share belonging to one participant does not reveal anything about the shares of 
others or even the secret itself. Besides the obvious feature which is to distribute a secret, secret-sharing schemes have also 
been used in secure multi-party computations and redundant residue number systems for error correction codes. In this 
paper, we propose that the secret-sharing scheme be used as a primitive in a Network-based Intrusion Detection System 
(NIDS) to detect attacks in encrypted networks. Encrypted networks such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) fully encrypt 
network traffic which can include both malicious and non-malicious traffic. Traditional NIDS cannot monitor encrypted 
traffic. Our work uses a combination of Shamir's secret-sharing scheme and randomised network proxies to enable a 
traditional NIDS to function normally in a VPN environment. In this paper, we introduce a novel protocol that utilises a 
secret-sharing scheme to detect attacks in encrypted networks.  
Introduction 
Secret-sharing schemes such as those initially proposed by Shamir [1] and Blakely [2] are used to 
securely distribute a secret among a group of participants. A (k, n) secret-sharing scheme is one where 
a single secret is split into n shares and any k shares is sufficient to recover the original secret where k < 
n. Secret-sharing has been used as the primitive of multi-party computations [3] and error correction 
codes [4]. In our work, we apply secret-sharing in a novel way to detect attacks perpetrated over 
encrypted networks. 
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) is based on the notion that computer misuse can be detected by 
analysing audit data in computer system or network. Audit data can be in the form of log files, file 
statuses and even network traffic. A host-based IDS (HIDS) operates within a host, monitoring log files 
and system calls for signs of potential abuse while a network-based IDS (NIDS) monitors network 
traffic for malicious activities. 
However, if the audit data cannot be accessed due to data corruption or encryption, the IDS cannot 
function properly. Our work focuses on the effects of encrypted networks on NIDS operations. We are 
motivated by the growing use of encrypted networks that obfuscate network traffic between any two 
hosts in the network. An encrypted network such as a secure virtual private network (VPN) encrypts 
the entire network, thus completely masking traffic – malicious or otherwise. This can negate the 
protection offered by a NIDS because it simply cannot analyse encrypted traffic. 
In this paper, we propose a novel method of using secret-sharing to allow a NIDS to function 
properly in a VPN. It does this without compromising on the confidentiality and integrity afforded by 
the VPN infrastructure. 
Related Works 
The most common approach to enable intrusion detection in VPNs is to co-locate a NIDS on the VPN 
gateway. In this setup, the VPN traffic from an external host is terminated at the VPN gateway located 
at the network perimeter. At this point, network traffic is decrypted by the VPN gateway and 
subsequently given to the co-located NIDS for analysis. If the NIDS detects benign traffic, it allows the 
traffic to pass to the internal host in cleartext form. If the traffic is malicious, an alert will be triggered 
and the malicious traffic is dropped. Wagner [5] proposed such an approach. Despite that, this approach 
does not support an end-to-end VPN tunnel, established from the external host right up to the internal 
host. The end-to-end tunnel offers the greatest amount of confidentiality. 
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A variant of the co-located NIDS approach is the man-in-the-middle approach that supports end-to-
end VPN tunnels. Yamada et al. [6] suggested that a VPN gateway with a co-located NIDS makes two 
separate VPN tunnels – one with a host on the left and another with the host on the right. With the 
gateway sitting in between the two communicating hosts, it is able to relay network traffic between 
them with each host believing that it is communicating directly with the other. It relays network traffic 
while analysing the network traffic that has been decrypted at the gateway before encrypting it again 
and sending it to the other host. This approach requires the private keys of both hosts and implies the 
use of a complicated Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
To the best of our knowledge, there are three other approaches that attempt to address this problem 
of detecting attacks over VPNs. The first approach uses statistical traffic analysis techniques to 
detection intrusions. Encrypted network traffic is extracted using network sniffers and then analysed to 
infer information from frequently observed patterns. Although network traffic is encrypted, there are 
still some outwardly observable features such as frequency and size of packets. These features can 
reveal certain trends and patterns that uniquely characterise certain attacks. Yamada et al. [6], Piccitto 
et al. [7] and Foroushani et al. [8] use statistical analysis to infer the presence of malicious activities in 
SSL and VPN traffic. Statistical analysis is nevertheless limited in scope due to the few traffic patterns 
that can be practically deduced solely from observing the network traffic. Moreover, a large volume of 
network traffic has to be collected and analysed before any obvious trends begin to emerge.  
The second approach detects misuse of network encryption protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) and IP Security (IPsec). A misuse is defined as a case where the internal states of these protocols 
do not transition from one state into another in an expected and predictable manner. Md. Fadlullah et 
al. [9] and Joglekar and Tate [10] proposed that whenever there is an unexpected transition, their 
intrusion detection systems assume that the encryption protocol is being misused and exploited for 
ulterior purposes. For the intrusion detection system to correctly identify whether such misuse, it must 
first have an accurate specification of a legitimately working encryption protocol. Any deviation from 
this specification is considered as an attack. However, the task of defining the specification is not trivial 
because every possible legitimate state must be modeled correctly. 
Both these approaches are suited to detecting attacks in encrypted networks because they do not 
directly analyse the payload contained within the encrypted packet. Instead, they monitor external 
features for specific trends that are symptomatic of attacks. Despite that, an attack can evade detection 
if it complies exactly with regular traffic. This is typical of application-level attacks such as SQL 
injection and buffer overflow attacks where the malicious codes are contained within the payload 
portion of the encrypted packet. Only a few network packets are needed to corrupt the target and as 
such is statistically insignificant. 
The third approach addresses the inability to detect application-level attack by using a framework 
that retrieves decrypted network traffic for deep packet inspection. A NIDS that performs deep packet 
inspections examines the payload portion of the packet. Abimbola et al. [11] and Wang et al. [12] 
proposed a framework where customised programs are installed into every network host. The program 
is able to extract already decrypted network traffic from the host and feed that into a NIDS for analysis. 
Although this approach recovers the decrypted payload for deep packet inspection, it does not consider 
the fact that the programs residing in the targeted hosts can be defeated if the host is compromised. 
We thus propose a detection framework that allows the use of deep packet inspection to detect 
attacks in VPN. The framework combines the use of two well-established technologies together, 
namely NIDS and VPN. This framework does not compromise on confidentiality and allows the 
establishment of end-to-end VPN tunnels. It also does not require a complicated PKI. 
Overview of Intrusion Detection System 
A traditional NIDS extracts network traffic for analysis using network sniffers. However, if the 
network is encrypted using a VPN, the NIDS is rendered useless. As such, our approach uses a host-
based approach where a custom network interface driver is installed on every host. The network 
interface driver is part of the detection framework that relies on a protocol that replicates network 
traffic from a sender and forwards that replicated traffic to both the NIDS and receiver. In other words, 
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a copy of all network traffic is explicitly forwarded to the NIDS. This is achieved while preserving the 
privacy and integrity of the communication exchange. 
 
Figure 1: OSI network model and the proposed detection protocol. 
The privacy and integrity of the network traffic is maintained because the proposed protocol 
functions on top of an underlying VPN infrastructure. In a VPN-enabled network, every link between 
network peers is encrypted by the VPN’s cryptographic algorithms. In Figure 1, we see that the 
proposed protocol is the topmost protocol in the network layer of the OSI model. Since it resides above 
VPN protocols such as IPsec, all network traffic that has been processed by the protocol is 
subsequently encapsulated by IPsec’s confidentiality and integrity algorithms. This architecture 
prevents unwanted eavesdropping or tampering by unauthorised third-parties while the payload is en 
route to its destination. More importantly, this architecture does not require that the VPN framework be 
modified in any way to accommodate the proposed protocol. 
 
Figure 2: Interactions between components in proposed detection protocol. 
In our work, we propose that a Central IDS (CIDS) be used together with forwarding proxies as 
shown in Figure 2. The CIDS is a traditional NIDS that performs traffic analysis and intrusion 
detection. The CIDS operates as a separate and dedicated host in the network. If a sender wishes to 
send network packets to a receiver, it will do so via the forwarding proxies. This traffic routing is 
achieved using the custom network interface driver that has been installed in the sender. The 
forwarding proxies in turn ensure that the network traffic is forwarded to the receiver and CIDS. Our 
protocol is summarised by the following principle: 
All traffic sent to a receiver by a sender must be replicated and forwarded also to the NIDS, 
without the possibility of the sender withholding traffic from the NIDS or forging fake traffic, and 
while  maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of the encrypted network. 
Although the VPN infrastructure prevents unauthorised network sniffing, the forwarding proxies 
are able to access the network packets relayed through them. This exposes the network packets to 
unwanted scrutiny and possible tampering while transiting through the proxies. To ensure 
confidentiality with respect to the proxies, we use secret-sharing. Each original packet is split into its 
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corresponding shares and it is these shares that are relayed through the proxies. The use of secret-
sharing thus ensures that the packets remain confidential without the need for a PKI.  
Secret-sharing scheme 
Our work uses Shamir's secret-sharing scheme [1]. Without loss of generality, a (k, n) secret-sharing 
scheme represents a secret S as a set of n shares where S = {s1, si, ..., sn} and k < n. Knowledge of any k 
or more si recovers S while knowledge of any k - 1 or less reveals nothing. If some of the shares are 
incorrect, the original secret cannot be recovered; that is {s1', si', ..., sn} ≠ S. Confidentiality is thus an 
inherent feature of a secret-sharing scheme if and only if the unauthorised party or colluding parties do 
not have k or more shares. 
We use Shamir's secret-sharing scheme because it is straightforward to implement and is not 
computationally too intensive. The secret-splitting process involves evaluating the polynomial at n 
different points. Using the Horner algorithm, the polynomial can be efficiently evaluated as a series of 
linear operations. This reduces the splitting process to a complexity of O(n) [13]. For the secret-
recovery process, the Lagrange form of the interpolation polynomial is known to be quadratic with a 
complexity of O(n2)  [14]. Secret-sharing also has the property where the size of each share does not 
exceed the size of the original secret. This is an important property for our protocol because it ensures 
that each share is bounded in size and suitable for transmission  over the network. 
Protocol Description 
If a sender wishes to send a message (i.e. network packet) to the receiver, the sender first splits the 
message into its corresponding shares using the secret-sharing scheme. So, if the message to be sent is 
M, its corresponding shares are M = {m1, mi, …, mn}. The sender then sends all n shares to n proxies. 
After receiving its share, each proxy randomly chooses where to forward the share to. There are four 
possible destinations: 
• Forward to the intended receiver with probability Pr; 
• Forward to the CIDS with probability Pc; 
• Forward to both the CIDS and receiver with probability Pb; or 
• Drop the share with probability Pd. 
 
The receiver and CIDS can recover the message M as long as they each receive at least k distinct 
shares. The algorithm that implements the protocol is shown in Table 1. 
 
Algorithm 
1. Sender splits packet M into corresponding shares of {m1, mi, …, mn} using a (k, n) secret-sharing 
scheme; 
2. Sender selects n proxies from a pool of N proxies where n < N; 
3. Each mi is sent to one of the n forwarding proxies, pi; 
4. Proxy pi does one of the four predefined actions; 
• Forward to receiver only with probability Pr; 
• Forward to CIDS only with probability Pc; 
• Forward to both CIDS and receiver with probability Pb; or 
• Drop the share with probability Pd. 
5. If the receiver receives k or more mi’s, it recovers the packet M; and 
6. If the CIDS receives k or more mi’s, it recovers packet M for analysis. 
 
Table 1: Algorithm for sending and receiving network packets 
We now consider the case of a sophisticated attacker who is able to manipulate the protocol. An 
attacker could evade detection by simultaneously sending two different types of messages; M to the 
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target while M' to the CIDS. This is done with the intention of misleading the CIDS with forged but 
harmless traffic M' while the receiver receives the malicious traffic M. 
For the sake of clarity, let M be the malicious traffic and M' be the forged but harmless traffic. They 
are represented by M = {m1, mi, ..., mn} and M' = {m1', mj', ..., mn'}. The attacker sends both M and M' 
to the proxies in the hopes that the proxies will forward mi only to the receiver and the CIDS only 
receives mj'. Since the actions of the proxies are a-priori unpredictable the attacker will not know 
beforehand which of the n proxies will forward to whom (CIDS, receiver or both). It is therefore 
impossible for the attacker to reliably select which proxies should receive shares of M and which 
should receive M' in the hopes of obtaining a favourable outcome for the attacker. With this 
uncertainty, the CIDS may receive k or more shares that resolve to one of the following cases with the 
use of Shamir's secret-sharing: 
1. Receives only mi shares and recovers M; 
2. Receives only mi' shares and recovers M'; or 
3. Receives a mixture of both mi and mj' shares. This case results in a corrupted message, C. 
 
Because of the randomly behaving proxies, it is with high probability that the shares will arrive 
mixed up, resulting in the corrupted message C. When C is received, the CIDS knows that there has 
been an attempt to forge fake message for the purpose of evading detection. Consequently, we envision 
two types of attacks that can be detected by our proposed approach. They are: 
• Application-level attack. Our approach is essentially a tunneling protocol. Network traffic, 
malicious or otherwise, that is received will always match the original content. Therefore, 
attacks sent through the tunnel can be detected by a standard NIDS. In any case, these attacks 
pose a traditional intrusion detection problem. 
• Evasion attack. These attacks attempt to evade CIDS detection in our context, by playing a 
game of chance with the random proxies. This can be detected if a message is corrupted upon 
delivery. 
Discussions 
As shown in Figure 1, the protocol functions at the network layer. Just like other network layer 
protocols, our proposed protocol only provides best-effort packet delivery. If reliable message delivery 
is required, a suitable transport layer protocol such as TCP can be used to encapsulate the message 
before handing it off to our protocol. TCP has built-in mechanisms that handle packet losses through 
retransmissions. 
An attacker could possibly bypass the forwarding proxies entirely and send its payload directly to 
the receiver. In an initially “clean” network, it is reasonable for a receiver to expect for the sender’s 
payload to arrive through the proxies. If the receiver receives the payload directly from the sender, it 
will ignore this non-compliant flow. Source address spoofing to fool the receiver into believing that it 
is receiving the payload from the proxies is also not possible. Peer authentication mechanism of the 
underlying VPN protocol ensures that the host is who it claims to be – sender or proxies [15]. As such, 
a malicious sender will have to comply with the protocol if it wants its payload to be properly 
delivered. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we introduce a detection framework that allows a traditional NIDS to perform deep 
packet inspection in an encrypted network traffic. The framework relies on a protocol that ensures all 
network traffic bound for the receiver is also sent to the NIDS for inspection. The VPN’s security 
protocols are leveraged upon to preserve confidentiality from unauthorized third-parties while secret-
sharing is used to maintain privacy from the forwarding proxies. 
We foresee a growth in attacks propagating through encrypted networks in the future. Traditional 
NIDS will no longer be feasible to address this problem and must be adapted accordingly. We believe 
that our approach is one step in that direction. 
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